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Abstract 
With a focus on the Russian Federation, this article examines the adoption 
by the Council of Europe of Protocol No.14 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and its long-delayed coming into force. The author 
starts with the question of the original object and purpose of the Council, 
and how they have now changed. This leads to an analysis of the nature of 
the crisis – a crisis of success – now faced by the ECHR system, and the 
reform process which started, on the 50th anniversary of the ECHR, in 
2000. After describing Protocol No.14 itself, and the discussion which has 
surrounded it, the article turns to the central issue. This is not the question of 
procedural reform, or even admissibility criteria, but what lies behind – the 
“soul” of the ECHR system. Should the Strasbourg Court remain a court 
which renders “individual justice”, albeit only for a handful of applicants 
and with long delays; or should it make become a court which renders 
“constitutional justice”? The article focuses on the specific problems faced 
by Russia in its relations with the Council of Europe; and an analysis of the 
lengthy refusal by the Russian State Duma to ratify Protocol No. 14. The 
author concludes with an attempted prognosis. 
A. Introduction – Protocol No.14bis? 
This article examines the adoption by the Council of Europe (CoE) of 
Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
its long-delayed coming into force. Although the Protocol was adopted in 
2004, it could not come into force until it had been ratified by all 47 
member states of the CoE. Only on Friday 15 January 2010 did the State 
Duma of the Russian Federation vote to ratify it.1 On 1 June 2010 Protocol 
14 at last came into force.2 Nevertheless, the ECHR system is now in deep 
crisis, and the question arises whether ratification of Protocol No. 14 will in 
fact play any significant role in alleviating that crisis. 
 
1
  See http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/15jan2010/14.html (last visited 27 August 
2010). 
2
  See A. Burkov, “Improvement in Compliance of the Russian Judicial System with the 
International Obligations Undertaken by the Russian Federation” (28 June 2010) 
available at http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/our-publications/column/improvement-
compliance-russian-judicial-system-international-obligations-undertaken-russian-
federation.html (last visited 27 August 2010). 
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In 2005 Lord Woolf predicted that the backlog of pending applications 
to the Court (those that have not been dealt with in any way, and have 
certainly not been communicated to the relevant government, much less 
held to be admissible or not) would increase year on year by about 20%, to 
250,000 in 2010, in any event.3 The view of the Rapporteur to the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is that 
 
“the case-processing capacity of the Court is likely to increase 
by 20 to 25% if two procedures envisaged in Protocol No. 14 to 
the ECHR were already now to be put into effect, i.e., the 
single-judge formation (to deal with plainly inadmissible 
applications) and the new competences of the three-judge 
committee (clearly well-founded and repetitive applications 
deriving from structural or systemic defects).”4 
 
Russian delay in ratification meant that the Committee, on the basis of 
the Rapporteur’s report, took the unprecedented step of recommending the 
adoption of a Protocol No. 14bis, which would not require unanimous 
ratification. 
I start with the question of the original object and purpose of the CoE, 
and how they have now changed. This leads me to an analysis of the nature 
of the crisis – a crisis of success – now faced by the ECHR system, and the 
reform process which started, on the 50th anniversary of the ECHR, in 
2000. 
After describing Protocol No. 14 itself, and the discussion which has 
surrounded it, I turn to the central issue. This is not the question of 
procedural reform, or even admissibility criteria, but what lies behind – the 
“soul” of the ECHR system. Should the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) remain a court which renders “individual justice”, albeit only for a 
 
3
  Lord Woolf, “Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human 
Rights” (December 2005) available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
40C335A9-F951-401F-9FC2-241CDB8A9D9A/0/LORDWOOLFREVIEWON 
WORKINGMETHODS.pdf (last visited 27 August 2010), 49. 
4
  K. De Vries, “Draft Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (28 April 2009) available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11879.pdf (last visited 
on 27 August 2010), para. 8. 
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handful of applicants and with long delays; or should it make a painful 
transition to a court which renders “constitutional justice”? 
Next, I analyse the specific problems faced by Russia in its relations 
with the CoE and the ECHR system; and the background to the lengthy 
refusal by the Russian State Duma to ratify Protocol No. 14. I add an 
extremely frank appraisal of the situation by Anatolii Kovler, the Russian 
judge on the ECtHR. 
I conclude with an attempted prognosis. 
B. What was the Council of Europe For? 
Even though the CoE now includes 47 states, and has a population of 
around 811 million people from Iceland to the Bering Straits, it had a much 
more limited significance at its inception. Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill have 
correctly stated that the CoE was 
 
“an organization created in 1949 as a sort of social and 
ideological counterpart to the military aspects of European co-
operation represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
[It] was inspired partly by interest in the promotion of European 
unity, and partly by the political desire for solidarity in the face 
of the ideology of Communism.”5 
 
In other words, the Western European states wished to demonstrate 
that they were as serious about the “first generation” of rights, the civil and 
political rights, as the USSR and its allies undoubtedly were with regard to 
the “second generation” of social and economic rights. After all, the 
“Communist” states guaranteed the rights to work, pensions, social security, 
health care, education and so on not only in their constitutions, but in 
practice. This provided the legitimacy of the “Communist” order, and is a 
reason why the USSR collapsed, indeed rotted away, rather than being 
overthrown. It also explains the continuing nostalgia especially in Russia for 
the late Soviet way of life. 
The CoE had its origins in May 1948, when 1000 delegates met at the 
Hague Conference.6 This has been called “The Congress of Europe”. A 
 
5
  I. Brownlie & G. Goodwin-Gill, Basic Documents on Human Rights, 5th ed. (2006), 
609. 
6
  http://www.ena.lu/congress_europe_hague_710_1948_overview-03-29731  
(last visited 25 August 2010). 
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series of resolutions were adopted at the end of the Congress. These called, 
amongst other things, for the creation of an economic and political union to 
guarantee security, economic independence and social progress; for the 
establishment of a consultative assembly elected by national parliaments; 
for the drafting of a European charter of human rights; and for the setting up 
of a court to enforce its decisions. The last of these was the most 
revolutionary. There was no precedent in international law for an 
international court with the power to interfere in the internal affairs of its 
member states, and to render obligatory judgments. 
The Congress also revealed some stark differences in approach. These 
divided unconditional supporters of a European federation (for example, 
France and Belgium) from those states that preferred straight-forward 
intergovernmental co-operation, such as the United Kingdom, the Republic 
of Ireland and the Scandinavian countries. 
On 27 and 28 January 1949, the five ministers for foreign affairs of 
the Brussels Treaty countries, meeting in Brussels, reached a compromise. 
This was for a “Council of Europe” consisting of a ministerial committee, to 
meet in private; and a consultative body, to meet in public. In order to 
satisfy the United Kingdom and its allies, the Assembly was to be purely 
consultative in nature, with decision-making powers vested in the 
Committee of Ministers. In order to satisfy the federalists, members of the 
Assembly were to be independent of their governments, with full voting 
freedom. The United Kingdom had demanded that they be appointed by 
their governments. This important aspect of the compromise was soon to be 
reviewed and, from 1951 onwards, parliaments alone were to choose their 
representatives.7 
The Statute of the CoE8 which opened for signature and was signed by 
ten states9 on 5 May 194910, defines “democracy” in the Preamble: 
“Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the 
common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, 




  At http://www.coe.az/Latest-News/4.html (last visited 25 August 2010). 
8
  Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm (last visited 
25 August 2010). 
9
  The 10 states which signed it on that day were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. 
10
  It came into force, following 7 ratifications, on 3 August 1949. 
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The work of drafting the ECHR occupied the Committee of Ministers 
(meeting in secret) and the Consultative Assembly (meeting in public) from 
11 May 1949 until 20 March 1952. The ECHR itself was opened for 
signature in Rome, 4 November 1950, while the First Protocol was opened 
for signature in Paris on 20 March 1952. The proceedings, so far as they 
were public, are published in the 8 volumes of the “Travaux 
préparatoires”.11 
According to Steven Greer and Andrew Williams, the original 
consensus was that 
 
“the Convention’s main modus operandi should be complaints 
made to an independent judicial tribunal by states against each 
other (the ‘inter-state’ process). At its inception, therefore, the 
Convention was much more about protecting the democratic 
identity of Member States through the medium of human rights 
[…] than it was about providing individuals with redress for 
human rights violations […]”12 
 
Thus, recognition of the right of individual petition did not become a 
requirement of membership of the system until the 1990s, after the collapse 
of Communism. Greer has also pointed out that the original raison d’être for 
the Convention has undergone a profound transformation since its inception 
in the Cold War: “[…] it now provides an ‘abstract constitutional identity’ 
for the entire continent, especially for the former communist states […]”.13 
C. The Crisis of the ECHR System, and the Reform 
Process 
The right of individual petition is at the centre of the ECHR system. 
But it is also a central cause of its current problems. In his recent Report for 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
 
11
  Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux préparatoires” of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Eight Volumes (1975-1985). 
12
  S. Greer & A. Williams, ‘Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: 
Towards “Individual”, “Constitutional” or “Institutional” Justice?’, 15 European Law 
Journal (2009) 4, 462, 464. 
13
  S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (2006), 170-171, [Greer, 2006]. 
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Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Rapporteur, Klaas de Vries, set out 
the nature of the crisis facing the Strasbourg Court.14 
 
“In 1999 [, according to this report] 22,650 applications were lodged 
and nearly 3,700 disposed of judicially. [Within less than 10 years,] in 
2006 over 50,000 applications were lodged of which nearly 30,000 
were disposed of judicially. In 2006, the number of incoming 
applications rose by 11%, with the number of new Russian 
applications rising by 38%.”15 
 
 At 30 June 2009, 108,350 applications were pending, an increase of 
11% from 1 January 2009, when there were 97,300. 57% of that number 
concerned Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, an increase of 23% in 
comparison with 2007. The report stated that  
 
“[i]n 2008 judgments were delivered in respect of 1,880 applications 
(compared with 1,735 in 2007 – an increase of 8%) and 32,043 
applications were disposed of judicially in 2008, an increase of 11% in 
relation to 2007.”16 
 
 Mr de Vries added: 
 
“It follows that the Court must urgently find a way in which to 
deal with, in particular, three matters: judges must not spend too 
much time on obviously inadmissible cases (approximately 95% 
of all applications), they must deal expeditiously with repetitive 
cases that concern already clearly established systemic defects 
within states (this represents approximately 70% of cases dealt 
with on the merits), and by so doing, concentrate their work on 
the most important cases and deal with them as quickly as 
possible.”17 
 
To this should be added the very long time that cases which have been 
declared admissible must wait for a determination by a chamber of the 
Court. In one of the Turkish Kurdish cases in which I represented the 
 
14
  De Vries, supra note 4. 
15
  Id., 3. 
16
  Id. 
17
  Id. 
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applicant, Abdurezzak Ipek v. Turkey18, the applicant complained of the 
“disappearance” at the hands of Turkish forces of two of his sons in 1994. 
The case was only declared admissible in May 2002, and there was a fact-
finding hearing in Turkey, at which I represented the applicant, in October 
2002. Judgment was finally pronounced in February 2004 – Turkey was 
found to have violated the right to life of the two sons – ten years after the 
violation and after the case was lodged. 
There has been no improvement. In 2008 while 34% of Chamber 
cases had been waiting for a year or less, 23% had been waiting from one to 
two years, 14% from two to three years, 11% from three to four years, 9% 
from four to five years, and as many as 9% for more than five years.19 
Thus, in the words of Laurence Helfer, “[…] the ECtHR has become a 
victim of its own success [and] […] now faces a docket crisis of massive 
proportions.”20 Helfer identifies two particular categories of case which are 
“[both far less and far more momentous than] flagging and clearing 
roadblocks in domestic democratic processes or adjudicating good faith 
government restrictions on individual liberties”21 The two classes of case 
are first of all the repetitive cases concerned with structural problems in 
civil, criminal and administrative proceedings. Secondly, there are the 
complaints of serious and pervasive human rights abuses such as 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention. 
The large number of judgments against Russia fall into both these 
categories: many concern the failure to enforce judgments given by the 
Russian courts, while there have also been many grievous complaints 
arising out of the conflict since 1999 in Chechnya. In many of these cases 
the prediction made by Robert Harmsen in 2001 came true: the Court ceased 
“to be a secondary guarantor of human rights and instead finds itself in a 
more crucial – and exposed – front-line position.”22 
 
18
  Ipek v. Turkey, ECHR, Application No. 25760/94, Judgment of 17 February 2004. 
19
  European Court of Human Rights, ‘Analysis of Statistics 2008’ (March 2009) 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/55E4E440-6ADB-4121-9CEB-
355E527600BD/0/Analysisofstatistics2008.pdf (last visited 25 August 2010), 11. 
20
  L. R. Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a 
Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’, 19 European 
Journal of International Law (2008) 1, 125. 
21
  Id., 129. 
22
  R. Harmsen, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement’, 5 The 
International Journal of Human Rights (2001) 4, 18, 29. 
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Leach has provided a detailed critical analysis of the reform process 
leading to the adoption of Protocol No. 14.23 Furthermore, the CoE has now 
published a large (718 pages) compendium entitled “Reforming the 
European Convention on Human Rights: A work in progress”24. This gives 
a full chronology of the various stages of the process, from 2000 to 2008. 
This started with the European Ministerial Conference on Human 
Rights held in Rome on 3-4 November 2000, on the 50th anniversary of the 
ECHR.25 The Committee of Ministers’ Deputies established an Evaluation 
Group of three persons including President Wildhaber, in February 2001. 
Their report was published in September 2001, and made a number of 
proposals.26 Although the Evaluation Group had carried out little 
consultation with civil society, a very large number of NGOs, including 
Amnesty International and others, national human rights institutions and bar 
associations adopted a Response27 which was highly critical of the 
proposals. Marie-Benedicte Dembour also commented that “what seems to 
be envisaged at the highest level […] is a Court that would be more or less 
free to choose the cases with which it deals.”28  
After a further period of consideration, and somewhat ineffective 
consultation, in October 2002 the Steering Committee for Human Rights 
(CDDH) produced a further Interim Report.29 In April 2003 the CDDH 
produced its Final Report on proposals for reforming the court30. 
However, the proposed changes to admissibility requirements were 
strongly criticised by PACE in April 2004, as “vague, subjective and liable 
 
23
  P. Leach, ‘Access to the European Court of Human Rights – From a Legal Entitlement 
to a Lottery?’, 27 Human Rights Law Journal (2006) 1-4, 11. 
24
  Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Reforming the European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Work in Progress. A Compilation of Publications and Documents 
Relevant to the Ongoing Reform of the ECHR (2009). 
25
  Id., 11-51. 
26
  ‘Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers on the European Court 
of Human Rights’, 22 Human Rights Law Journal (2001) 5-8, 308. 
27
  NGO Response to the Report of the Evaluation Group; see Leach supra note 23, 13. 
28
  M.-B. Dembour, ‘“Finishing Off Cases”: The Radical Solution to the Problem of the 
Expanding ECHR Caseload’, European Human Rights Law Review (2002) 5, 604, 
622. 
29
  Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Interim Report of the CDDH to Be 
Submitted to the Committee of Ministers – Guaranteeing the Long-term Effectiveness 
of the European Court of Human Rights’, CM (2002) 146, 18 October 2002. 
30
  CDDH, ‘Guaranteeing the Long-term Effectiveness of the European Court of Human 
Rights – Final Report Containing Proposals of the CDDH’, CM (2003) 55, 8 April 
2003. 
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to do the applicant a serious injustice”.31 In February 2004 Amnesty 
International had also published a critical Comment.32 Nevertheless, the 
CoE proceeded to the adoption of the new Protocol. 
D. Protocol No. 14 
Finally, Protocol No. 1433 was adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
in May 2004.34 The additional admissibility criterion for Article 35 provides 
that a case may be declared inadmissible if the Court considers that: 
 
“the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless 
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on 
the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this 
ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal.”35 
 
Leach points out that the question what is “due consideration” will be 
very difficult to answer in the context of such a variety of legal systems and 
procedures.36 It is plain that there will be ample scope for the application of 
judicial discretion. 
The other significant changes proposed by Protocol No. 14 are: 
 
- in certain cases a single judge will be able to decide on 
inadmissible applications 
- a simplified summary procedure will enable a committee of 
three judges to decide on the admissibility and merits of 
“repetitive violation” and “clone” cases 
 
31
  PACE, ‘Opinion No. 251 (2004)’, 26 Human Rights Law Journal (2005) 1-4, 106. 
32
  Amnesty International, ‘Comments on the Interim Activity Report: Guaranteeing the 
Long-Term Effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights’, 2004, AI Index: 
IOR 61/005/2004. 
33
  Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/194.htm (last visited 
26 August 2010). 
34
  ‘Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, Amending the Control System of the Convention, 13 
May 2004’, 26 Human Rights Law Journal (2005) 1-4, 88. 
35
  Article 12 Protocol No.14 to the ECHR, amending Article 35(3) of the Convention. 
36
  Leach, supra note 23, 19. 
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- a new procedure will enable the Committee of Ministers to 
bring proceedings to the Court where a state refuses to abide 
by a judgment 
- judges will be appointed for a single 9 year term 
- the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights will be entitled to 
intervene in cases as a third party. 
 
That was not the end of the process. In December 2005 Lord Woolf 
published his Report “Review of the Working Methods of the European 
Court of Human Rights”37 at the request of the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe and the President of the Court. His terms of reference 
were: 
 
“To consider what steps can be taken by the President, judges 
and staff of the European Court of Human Rights to deal most 
effectively and efficiently with its current and projected 
caseload, and to make recommendations accordingly to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe and to the President 
of the Court.”38 
 
He made a number of detailed recommendations for reform of 
procedure. In June 2006 a seminar – “The European Court of Human 
Rights: Agenda for the 21st Century” – took place in Warsaw39, followed in 
November 2006 by the Report of the Group of Wise Persons (which include 
Venyamin Yakovlev of Russia, former Chairman of the Higher Arbitrazh 
Court) to the Committee of Minsters40. On 22-23 March 2007 a Colloquy 
took place in San Marino entitled “Future Developments of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Light of the Wise Persons Report”41. The 
Secretary General of the CoE, Terry Davis, noted that Protocol No. 14 had 
still not come into force, three years after its adoption.42 On 9-10 June 2008 
a further Colloquy took place in Stockholm, on the vexed question of 
 
37
  Lord Woolf, supra note 3. 
38
  Lord Woolf, supra note 3, 2. 
39
  CDDH, supra note 24, 131-215. 
40
 Available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1063779&BackColorInternet= 
9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 (last visited 26 
August 2010). 
41
  CDDH, supra note 24, 217-280. 
42
  CDDH, supra note 24, 224. 
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implementation of the ECHR at national level.43 Veronika Milinchuk, then 
the Russian State Agent at the Court, recognised that “failure to execute, or 
delays in execution of court decisions was one of the pressing issues 
addressed by Russian nationals […]” at the Court.44 She added: 
 
“Notwithstanding all the efforts taken (including the allocation 
by the Russian Ministry of Finance of purposeful large-scale 
transfers), at the beginning of 2007 there were thousands of non-
executed court decisions on settlement of ‘old’ debts, especially 
indexation of tardy monetary payments, at the expense of the 
Russian constituent entities’ budgets.”45 
 
This has now become, as I show below, a major source of 
embarrassment for Russia, threatening its very membership of the CoE. 
E. The Soul of the ECHR 
The debate around Protocol No. 14 could be said to conceal a much 
more fundamental argument about the nature and future of the ECHR 
system. Helfer states that “[t]he individual complaints mechanism of the 
ECtHR is the crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international 
system for protecting civil and political liberties.”46 But there is now as a 
result a lively and very serious debate as to whether the Court should 
provide “individual” or “constitutional” justice. Marie Dembour described 
the former view as follows: “[…] the raison d'être of the Strasbourg Court is 
precisely that it will hear any case, from anyone who claims to be a victim 
of the Convention; there are no unworthy cases (except of course those 
which traditionally have been declared inadmissible).”47 
Philip Leach is a strong proponent of the importance of the right of 
individual application.48 He cites the words of the CDDH’s Reflection 
Group, which described the right of individual petition as being “the 
 
43
  CDDH, supra note 24, 463-559. 
44
  CDDH, supra note 24, 506. 
45
  CDDH, supra note 24, 506. 
46
  Helfer, supra note 20, 159. 
47
  Dembour, supra note 28, 621. 
48
  Leach, supra note 23. 
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distinctive and unique achievement of the Convention system.”49 For Leach, 
“[…] the right of individual application has become unquestionably by far 
the most important part of the Convention system, over and above the inter-
state process, which is very rarely invoked.” He notes that as at January 
2004 there had been just 20 inter-state cases.50 He underlines the fact that at 
the heart of objections to proposals for limiting individual access to the 
Court has been a “fundamental concern that the amendments to the 
admissibility criteria will restrict the right of individuals to seek redress at 
the European Court, without adequately tackling the problem of the 
increasing number of Convention violations across Europe.”51  
Leach’s use of the word “lottery” derives from the fact that a very 
high proportion of all applications submitted to the Court are declared 
inadmissible under the current criteria, more than 96% in 2005; and some 
60-70% of the judgments in the cases found to be admissible concern 
“repetitive cases”, a very high proportion of them cases on excessive length 
of proceedings.52 
The “constitutional” argument was set out in 2002 by the former 
President of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber. He identified a  
 
“fundamental dichotomy running throughout the Convention. 
This is as to whether the primary purpose of the Convention 
system is to provide individual relief or whether its mission is 
more a ‘constitutional’ one of determining issues on public 
policy grounds in the general interest.”53 
 
In his view, the way forward for the Court was to “concentrate its 
efforts on decisions of ‘principle’, decisions which create jurisprudence.”54 
These he referred to as the “[…] leading judgments, judgments of principle, 
the judgments that contribute to the Europe-wide human rights 
jurisprudence, that help to build up the European ‘public order’”55. 
 
49
  Reflection Group on the Protection of the Reinforcement of the Human Rights 
Protection Mechanism, ‘Activity Report’, 15 June 2001, CDDH-GDR (2001) 010. 
50
  Leach, supra note 23, 19. 
51
  Leach, supra note 23, 24. 
52
  Leach, supra note 23, 23-24. 
53
  Luzius Wildhaber, ’A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human 
Rights?’, 23 Human Rights Law Journal (2002) 5-7, 161, 162. 
54
  Id., 164. 
55
  Id., 163. 
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Steven Greer has become the most articulate advocate for a 
fundamental change in the nature of the ECHR system. In a major article 
published in 200356, he identified three quintessentially constitutional 
questions for the ECHR usually described as principles of interpretation (for 
example, positive obligations, dynamic interpretation, subsidiarity, 
proportionality etc.): 
 
“the ‘normative question’ of what a given Convention right 
means, including its relationship with other rights and with 
collective interests; the ‘institutional question’ of which 
institutions should be responsible for providing the answer; and 
the ‘adjudicative question’ of how, by which judicial method, 
the normative question should be addressed”.57 
 
The Court has, he argues, fallen short of a proper application of the 
Convention’s constitution first, because its judgments tend to be formulaic, 
“thin”, and in many cases are decisions on the facts, and second, because the 
interpretive principles are never put into any particular order. He concludes:  
 
“[t]here is rarely any sense that the implications of deep 
constitutional values, in a state of dynamic tension with each 
other, are being carefully teased out, with the result that the 
jurisprudence has been deprived of the ‘constitutional authority’ 
it might otherwise possess and which it clearly requires.”58 
 
In his later book59, he argued that, regrettably, none of the Strasbourg 
Committees contributing to the pre-Protocol 14 debate had adequately 
considered whether the Court should be concerned with delivering 
“individual” or “constitutional” justice or both. However, it is noteworthy 
that the CDDH considered the question, albeit inconclusively: 
 
“The CDDH does not […] believe that the choice is one 
between two views that seem radically opposed: one under 
which the Court would deliver ‘individual justice’; the other 
 
56
  Steven Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2003) 3, 405-433 [Greer, 2003]. 
57
  Id., 407. 
58
  Id., 407. 
59
  Greer, 2006, supra note 13. 
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under which the Court would deliver ‘quasi-constitutional 
justice’. Both functions are legitimate functions for a European 
Court of Human Rights, and the proposals set out in this report 
seek to reconcile the two.”60 
 
Greer characterised the opposing positions as follows. The desire for 
“individual justice” he described as 
 
“[…] the attempt […] to ensure that every genuine victim of a 
violation receives a judgment in their favour from the Court 
however slight the injury, whatever the bureaucratic cost, 
whether or not compensation is awarded, and whatever the 
likely impact of the judgment on the conduct or practice in 
question…”.61 
 
This is of course rather a caricature!  
Greer gave “constitutional justice” a rather more sympathetic 
description: 
 
“[It is] the attempt by the Convention system to ensure that 
cases are both selected and adjudicated by the Court in a manner 
which contributes most effectively to the identification, 
condemnation and resolution of violations, particularly those 
which are serious for the applicant, for the respondent state 
(because, for example, they are built into the structure or modus 
operandi of its public institutions), or for Europe as a whole 
(because, for example, they may be prevalent in more than one 
state).”62 
 
Greer made the highly salient point that if in 2005 the Court’s capacity 
for judgment on the merits was 1,039 cases (the figure for 2008 was 1,880 
[compared with 1,735 in 2007 – an increase of 8% in the year63, not much of 
an increase in reality]) and the population of the Council’s 47 states is some 
811 million people, then “any given citizen of a Council of Europe state has 
 
60
  CDDH, supra note 30, para. 11. 
61
  Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 166. 
62
  Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 166-167. 
63
  European Court of Human Rights, supra note 19. 
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[…] about one in a million chance of having their complaint adjudicated 
[…]”.64 
He was also critical of the position of Amnesty International and the 
other NGOs. In particular, Amnesty asserted that individuals have a right 
“to receive a binding determination from the European Court of Human 
Rights of whether the facts presented constitute a violation […]”.65 Greer 
points out, quite correctly, that the rights in question are to petition the 
Court and to receive a response. But, of course, only those whose cases are 
admissible, a tiny fraction of those who apply, have the right to a 
determination.66 Greer then surveyed the practice of the European Court of 
Justice, with its system of preliminary rulings, and the US Supreme Court, 
and the German Federal Constitutional Court, both of which have a wide 
discretion as to which cases to hear.67 But despite his urgent desire to 
enhance the constitutional mission of the Court, his conclusion was not so 
radical: 
 
“In spite of its weaknesses it would be a mistake to terminate the 
individual applications process because it would be difficult to 
find a potentially more effective replacement and because, 
suitably altered, it may still be capable of facilitating the 
delivery of constitutional justice. However, individual 
applications should be selected for adjudication by the Court 
more because of their constitutional significance for the 
respondent state and for Europe as a whole, and less because of 
their implications for individual applicants.”68 
 
He was less forthcoming as to how, in addition to or in place of 
Protocol No. 14, this might be achieved. And, of course, he was writing in 
2006, in the belief that Protocol No. 14 would be ratified. 
Lucius Caflisch, himself a judge of the Court, takes an even more 
pessimistic view: “Protocol No. 14 will bring some, but insufficient, relief. 
For this reason, a Protocol No. 15 will be necessary, and work on it has 
already begun. Accordingly, there will have to be, after the reform of 1998 
 
64
  Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 170. 
65
  Amnesty International, supra note 32, para. 5. 
66
  Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 173. 
67
 Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 176-189. 
68
 Greer, 2006, supra note 13, 322. 
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and the ‘reform of the reform’ of 2004, a ‘reform of the reform of the 
reform’.”69 
F. Continuing Tension Between Russia and the Council 
of Europe 
In addition to the matters discussed above, a further restructuring of 
the reform of 2004 appeared to the CoE to be necessary because of Russia’s 
continuing failure to ratify Protocol No. 14. 
On Wednesday 20 December 2006, the Russian State Duma (lower 
house of parliament) voted to refuse ratification of Protocol No. 14 to the 
ECHR, despite the fact that Russia had promised to ratify, and the draft law 
on ratification had been sent by the government. The debate indicated why 
the majority of the Duma voted against ratification70. 
The debate in the State Duma and media reactions showed that the 
refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14 was not based on a critique of the reforms 
themselves, but were a response to perceived discrimination against 
Russia.71 
Russia poses an ever increasing problem for the Strasbourg Court. It 
has in recent years been losing some high-profile cases in the Court72. 
In Aleksanyan v. Russia73 the applicant, who was held in pre-trial 
detention, was seriously ill with AIDS. The Court drew attention to the fact 
that it had 
 
“[…] indicated to the Government two interim measures74 […] 
on 27 November 2007, and then confirmed in December 2007 
 
69
  L. Caflisch, ‘The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No.14 
and Beyond’, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 2, 403, 415. 
70
  For further details on the Duma's vote see Bill Bowring, ‘Russia and Human Rights: 
Incompatible Opposites?’, 1 Goettingen Journal of International Law (2009) 2, 257, 
274. 
71
  “Duma Gives It to the European Court”, available at 
http://www.kommersant.com/p732043/r_500/State_Duma_European_Court/ (last 
visited 26 August 2010). 
72
  For an overview of judgments of 2004 and 2005 see Bowring, supra note 70, 273. 
73
  Aleksanyan v. Russia, ECHR, Application no. 46468/06, Judgment of 22 December 
2008, final on 5 June 2009 following rejection of Russia’s request for a hearing by the 
Grand Chamber. 
74
  Following the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECHR (GC), Application 
nos 46827/99 and 46951/99, performance of such interim measures is obligatory. 
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and January 2008. The Court, in view of the critical state of the 
applicant’s health, invited the Government to transfer him to a 
specialist medical institution. However, it was not until 8 
February that the applicant was transferred to Hospital no. 60. 
[…] What is clear is that for over two months the Government 
continuously refused to implement the interim measure, thus 
putting the applicant’s health and even life in danger. The 
Government did not suggest that the measure indicated under 
Rule 39 was practically unfeasible; on the contrary, the 
applicant’s subsequent transfer to Hospital no. 60 shows that 
this measure was relatively easy to implement. In the 
circumstances, the Court considers that the non-implementation 
of the measure is fully attributable to the authorities’ reluctance 
to cooperate with the Court.”75 
 
A further interim measure was indicated against Russia: 
 
“Secondly, the Court notes that the Government did not comply 
with the second interim measures indicated by the Court on 21 
December 2007. Namely, they did not allow the applicant’s 
examination by a mixed medical commission which would 
include doctors of his choice … Despite the applicant’s attempt 
to form such a team, the Government refused to cooperate with 
him in this respect.”76 
 
In the circumstances, the Court held that the Russian Government had 
failed to honour its commitments under Article 34 of the Convention (“The 
High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of [the right of petition]”). 
Moreover, Russia is now making a major contribution to the crisis of 
the Court. This can be shown by a comparison between 2006 and 2008. In 
2006, 10,569 (out of a total of 50,500) complaints were made against 
Russia, of which 380 were referred to the Russian government, and 151 
were found to be admissible. There were 102 judgments against Russia (out 
of 1,498 against all CoE states). In 2008 there were 269 judgments against 
Russia, and 825 cases were communicated to the government.77 By the end 
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  Aleksanyan v. Russia, ECHR, Application no. 46468/06, para. 230. 
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  Id., para. 231. 
77
  European Court of Human Rights, supra note 19. 
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of 2006, of 89,887 cases pending before the Court, about 20% concerned 
Russia, 12% Romania and 10% Turkey.78 In 2008 Russia was again the 
leader, with 27,250 pending before a judicial formation, 28.0% of the 
total.79 
Consequently, Russia has been the subject of continuing criticism 
from the CoE.  
On 26 May 2008, PACE published the latest in a series of important 
reports by the Cypriot parliamentarian Christos Pourgourides. The report, 
“Implementation of Judgments of the European Court Of Human Rights”80, 
was prepared for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. 
Pourgourides regretted that the non-execution of the Strasbourg Court’s case 
law remains a (major) problem with respect to 11 States Parties81 to the 
ECHR. 
The following issues were highlighted with respect to Russia. First, he 
raised deficient judicial review over pre-trial detention, resulting in its 
excessive length and overcrowding of detention facilities. Here, Russia was 
seen to be taking determined steps following the Kalashnikov judgment (15 
July 2002).82 Second, Pourgourides turned to the problem of chronic non-
enforcement of domestic judicial decisions delivered against the state. 
Again, he was able to report a series of relevant measures, taken in close 
cooperation with the CoE. Third, violations of the ECHR in the Chechen 
Republic continue to cause concern, with the Russian authorities 
maintaining their refusal to allow access to investigation files.83 
These concerns were echoed by the Russian judge on the Strasbourg 
Court, Anatolii Kovler, at a meeting with the Russian Constitutional Court 
in St Petersburg on Friday 27 February 2009. Kovler reviewed the results 
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  European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Survey of Activity for 2006’ (2007) 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/69564084-9825-430B-9150-
A9137DD22737/0/Survey_2006.pdf (last visited 26 August 2010). 
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  European Court of Human Rights, supra note 19. 
80
  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Implementation of Judgments of the 
European Court Of Human Rights’, AS/Jur (2008) 24, declassified on 2 June 2008. 
81
  Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. 
82
  The author can confirm this. He acted as lead expert for the CoE in a seminar in June 
2008 in Pskov, with leaders of the Russian penitentiary service (FSIN). 
83
  See the judgments of the Court in the cases of Bazorkina v. Russia, ECHR (2006) (No. 
69481/01), Imakayeva v. Russia (2006) (No.7615/02); Committee of Ministers’ 
Memorandum CM/Inf/DH(2006)32 revised 2, § 15; PACE Resolution 1571 (2007) 
and Recommendation 1809 (2007) on member states’ duty to co-operate with the 
European Court of Human Rights, Doc 11183 and Addendum. 
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for Russia before the ECtHR in 2008 (reported above) and asserted that if 
Russia within the next six months failed to resolve the “systemic problem”84 
of failure to execute court decisions, this could lead to termination of 
Russian membership in the CoE. 
Kovler observed that 2008 had witnessed a “falling dynamic” and a 
“saturated market”85 of complaints against Russia. In 2008 10,500 
applicants had complained to the ECtHR, however the number of 
complaints found to be admissible had risen, while the number of judgments 
was a record (269 as mentioned above). The Court had issued 40 findings of 
non-effective investigation of crimes in Chechnya, and for the first time had 
found in more than 20 cases “the absence of effective remedies” for 
Russians in relation to wrongful use of detention as a pre-trial “measure of 
restraint”, and in relation to conditions in remand prisons (SIZOs). But the 
most glaring tendency of 2008 had been the lengthy non-execution of 
judgments of Russian courts and the absence of a mechanism for payment 
of damages by the government for unlawful actions of judges. Some 72% of 
judgments against Russia at the ECtHR concern this problem, and there are 
now more than 5,000 of them awaiting decisions. In September 2008 the 
Supreme Court, on the proposal of President Medvedev, had submitted to 
the State Duma a draft constitutional law to remedy this problem. But the 
draft law had been “cut to the roots” by bureaucrats.86 
The patience of the ECtHR had, said Kovler, been exhausted by the 
case Burdov v Russia No.2.87 In this case the applicant, a veteran of 
Chernobyl, complained of the non-payment of compensation owed to him as 
the result of judgments of the Russian courts and of the ECtHR.88 In this 
repeat complaint the ECtHR not only ordered Russia to pay Mr Burdov 
6,000 Euro, but also held that these violations “originated in a practice 
incompatible with the Convention which consists in the State’s recurrent 
failure to honour judgment debts and in respect of which aggrieved parties 
have no effective domestic remedy.” The Court also delivered what is in 




  A. Pushkarskaya, ‘Yevropeiskiy sud pozhalovalsya na Possiyu Konstitutsionnomu: 
Potrebovav ispolneniya sudebnikh resehenii’, No.36P (4091), at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1128309 (last visited 26 August 2010). 
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  Id. 
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  Application No. 33509/04. 
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  See Burdov v. Russia, ECHR (2002) No. 59498/00, Judgment of 7 May 2002. 
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“the respondent State must set up, within six months from the 
date on which the judgment becomes final […], an effective 
domestic remedy or combination of such remedies which 
secures adequate and sufficient redress for non-enforcement or 
delayed enforcement of domestic judgments in line with the 
Convention principles as established in the Court’s case-law; 
[…] the respondent State must grant such redress, within one 
year from the date on which the judgment becomes final, to all 
victims of non-payment or unreasonably delayed payment by 
State authorities of a judgment debt in their favour who lodged 
their applications with the Court before the delivery of the 
present judgment and whose applications were communicated to 
the Government.”89 
 
Kovler pointed out that this would, if implemented, enable the ECtHR 
to get rid of about one thousand cases. He added that Russia is a “front-
runner” in failing to execute the judgments of the ECtHR itself and 
explained that the Committee of Ministers of the CoE will ensure execution 
of this and other judgments of the ECtHR, including the use of sanctions 
including resolutions and warnings, right up to the termination of Russia’s 
membership of the CoE: “This is our (the ECtHR’s) reply for Russia’s 
failure to ratify Protocol No. 14”90. It was reported that Kovler had the full 
support and understanding of the justices of the Constitutional Court.91 
The Russian government was in a quite different, more truculent, 
mood. On the same day, the Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Justice 
alleged that the Strasbourg Court was guilty of lack of objectivity and of 
bias in relation to Russia. The Russian Minister of Justice, Aleksandr 
Konovalov and the Russian Representative (Agent) before the Strasbourg 
Court (and also a Deputy Minister of Justice) Georgii Matyushkin argued 
that a series of the Court’s decisions concerning Russia suffered from a lack 
of reasons. These included the decision of the admissibility of the YUKOS 
claim against Russia, for billions of dollars following the destruction of the 
company by the Kremlin, and the recognition of the British barrister Piers 
Gardner as representative of YUKOS. Mr Konovalov also emphasised that 
recent decisions of the Courts raised doubts as to the “fairness and complete 
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  Id. 
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objectivity of the Court”, since these decisions “remain incomprehensible 
for Russia”.92 
On 13 July 2009, Mr Matyushkin spoke at a press conference 
following a meeting between the Ministry of Justice and the Constitutional 
Court.93 He stated that the ECtHR had transgressed the boundaries of its 
own competence in hearing cases concerning events in Chechnya. In his 
words the Court had allowed itself to be led by the illicit presumption that 
every person who “disappeared” in Chechnya had been murdered. Mr 
Matyushkin sought to assert that the fact of killing by the Russian 
government “should first of all be established according to Russian Law.” 
The answer to this suggestion is to be found in one of the series of Chechen 
cases94, in which the Court held, as it has so often done: 
 
“no explanation has been forthcoming from the Russian 
Government as to the circumstances of the deaths, nor has any 
ground of justification been relied on by them in respect of the 
use of lethal force by their agents. It is thus irrelevant in this 
respect whether the killings had occurred “with the knowledge 
or on the orders” of the federal authorities. Liability for the 
applicants' relatives' deaths is therefore attributable to the 
respondent State and there has been a violation of Article 2 in 
respect of the applicants' eleven relatives killed.”95 
 
It is evident that despite the very frank analysis of Judge Kovler, the 
Russian government authorities, as represented by the Ministry of Justice 
and its Deputy Minister, the Russian representative before the ECtHR, 
seemed determined to keep up the rhetorical offensive against the Court and 
the ECHR system as a whole. 
There was a further complicating factor, connected with the YUKOS 
case against Russia at Strasbourg. 
The YUKOS oil company, which was originally state owned, became 
the largest, most successful and most transparent oil company in Russia. In 
July 2003, a series of raids were carried out by Russian law enforcement 
agencies on YUKOS premises. On 25 October 2003 YUKOS’ owner, 
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Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested. On 31 May 2005 Mr Khodorkovsky 
was convicted of serious offences of fraud and was sentenced to nine years 
imprisonment, later reduced to eight years. A second trial of him and his 
colleague Mr Lebedev is now under way in Moscow. 
On 23 April 2004 YUKOS lodged its application to the European 
Court of Human Rights.96 YUKOS complains of violations of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR (right to property). In more detail, these complaints 
are: 
- YUKOS had been deprived of its possessions and that these 
deprivations had not been in accordance with the law and 
had imposed a disproportionate burden on it. 
- the tax liability and enforcement proceedings were a de facto 
disguised expropriation.  
- the seizure of assets was disproportionate in that the authorities 
ordered YUKOS to pay, and at the same time froze its 
assets, worth considerably more than its then liability 
- the time of merely a couple of days given to YUKOS for 
payment was absurdly short 
- the sale of OAO Yuganskneftegaz was unlawful, conducted at 
a gross undervaluation through a plainly controlled auction, 
with the participation of a sham bidder, OOO 
Baykalfinansgrup. 
 
On 29 January 2009 the Court held that YUKOS’ application was 
partly admissible. Although the Court has yet to make its findings on the 
merits, this has been taken as an indication that YUKOS may win. 
There has now been an oral hearing in this case. It took place before 
the Grand Chamber on 4 March 2010.97 Initially, the hearing was to have 
taken place on 19 November 2009. However, on 20 October 2009 Russia 
announced the appointment of a new judge ad hoc to sit on the case, after 
the first person appointed, St Petersburg Professor Valerii Musin, recused 
himself as he had been made a director of Russian state-owned Gazprom. 
The new appointee was not even a professor, but a senior lecturer of the 
same university, Andrei Bushev, who had studied with President 
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  OAO Neftyanaya kompaniya YUKOS v. Russia Application No. 14902/04. 
97
  See B. Bowring, ‘The YUKOS Hearing at Strasbourg’, EU-Russia Centre (22 March 
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Medvedev.98 Russia then sought and was granted a further adjournment 
until 14 January 2010, to enable the new judge to familiarise himself with 
the case file. 
However, on 13 January 2010 the Court announced, at the last 
possible moment, yet another adjournment at the request of Russia, this time 
to 4 March 2010. The grounds for Russia’s request were two-fold. Mr 
Bushev was said to be in ill-health; and the Russian Agent (Plenipotentiary) 
at Strasbourg, Georgii Matyushkin, was said to be obliged to return to 
Moscow as the State Duma were to vote, on 15 January, on ratification by 
Russia of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, on the reform of the Court – the last 
of the CoE’s 47 member states to do so, following a very long delay of six 
years.99 The Law on Ratification, signed by President Medvedev, was 
published in the official Rossiiskaya Gazeta on 8 February 2010. 
There was intense speculation by informed Russian commentators that 
the continued delay was the result of an attempt by Russia to ratify Protocol 
No. 14 before any hearing, in the hope of obtaining from the Court a quid 
pro quo, in the form of a more favourable judgment.100 
The leading legal affairs journalist, Olga Pleshanova, reported these 
rumours, strongly denied by Russia, in the daily Kommersant on 14 January 
2010, and also reported that on 18 December 2009 Mr Matyushkin had used 
a conference at the Russian Academy of Justice held to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the Strasbourg court, in order to launch a strong attack on the 
European Court of Human Rights. He spoke of contradictory decisions of 
the Court, in which it had first recognised the competence of an applicant 
company despite the objections of the respondent state, then done the 
opposite. Although he did not name the case, it was clear to all that he was 
referring precisely to the YUKOS case, and Russia’s insistence that 
YUKOS should be represented by the liquidator, Mr Rebgun. 
In late December 2009 President Medvedev presented to the State 
Duma a package of draft laws to reform the judicial system on the 
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recommendations of the CoE, including the creation of courts of appeal.101 
In Pleshanova’s view, Russia hopes that the hearing on 4 March will take 
place against the background of unprecedented Russian compliance with the 
CoE’s wishes. 
G. Why Protocol No. 14bis? 
The refusal of the Russian State Duma to ratify Protocol No. 14 
finally gave rise to a considered response. At its 1054th meeting on 15-16 
April 2009, the CoE’s Committee of Ministers invited the Parliamentary 
Assembly to provide it with an opinion on draft Protocol No. 14bis to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, with the request that this be done 
during its part-session in April 2009, under the urgent procedure provided 
for in Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. On 27 April 2009, 
the Assembly referred the request of the Committee of Ministers for an 
opinion to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for a report. 
Mr Klaas de Vries was appointed as Rapporteur. According to the Report of 
Mr de Vries, dated 28 April 2009,  
 
“the case-processing capacity of the Court is likely to increase by 20 
to 25% if two procedures envisaged in Protocol No. 14 were now to 
be put into effect, i.e., the single-judge formation (to deal with plainly 
inadmissible applications) and the new competences of the three-judge 
committee (clearly well-founded and repetitive applications deriving 




“only deplore the State Duma’s refusal to provide its assent, 
since December 2006, to the ratification of Protocol No. 14 by 
Russia. By so doing, the State Duma has, in effect, considerably 
aggravated the situation in which the Court has found itself, and 
has also deprived persons within the jurisdiction of the Russian 
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Federation from benefiting from a streamlined case-processing 
procedure before the Court.”103 
 
The new proposal was for the adoption of an Additional Protocol. As 
opposed to Protocol No. 14, which is an “amending protocol” which must 
be ratified by all states parties in order to enter into force, Protocol No. 
14bis104 is to be an “additional protocol” which could enter into force after 
its ratification by a certain number of states parties, but not all of them. As 
explained in the Explanatory Memorandum, this additional protocol requires 
only three ratifications for it to come into force. The number of states is set 
at three only, in order to allow the protocol to enter into force as quickly as 
possible. 
H. A New Mood in the Russian Elite? 
On Tuesday 22 June 2010 there was a true sensation at the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. The Russian delegation joined a 
unanimous vote for a report and resolution condemning Russian policy in 
the North Caucasus. This is the first time such a resolution has been voted 
through without dissent in the 14 years of Russia’s membership on the 
CoE.105 Tom Balmforth asked: “No one doubts this is a signal from the 
Kremlin, but deciphering it is another matter. Is it all just a PR smoke 
screen, or are there fresh political winds blowing in the Kremlin?”106 
There are a number of additional straws in the wind. On 25 March 
2010 President Medvedev submitted a draft Federal Law “On compensation 
of citizens for violation of the right to a fair trial within reasonable time or 
the right to execution of a judgment within a reasonable time.” This law was 
designed to answer the demands of the ECtHR in Burdov No.2 (above), and 
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entered into force on 4 May 2010. The courts have already started receiving 
applications.107 
And on 1 July 2010 the Federal Law of 2008 “On securing access to 
information on the activity of courts in the Russian Federation”108 came into 
force. This law requires Russian courts at all levels to publish their 
judgments and decisions on the internet. The delay between promulgation 
and coming into force was intended to give the courts the time to acquire the 
necessary technical means and expertise.109 As Anton Burkov points out: 
“This is an unusual step for a country where there is civil law such as 
Russia, where, until recently, the only judgments accessible to the public 
were decisions by the Constitutional Court and partial decisions by the 
supreme courts.”110 
I. Conclusion 
Steven Greer and Andrew Williams have recently commented that 
pursuit by the ECHR system of the individual justice model, “coupled with 
the ever-increasing case-load, threatens to bring the whole structure 
grinding to a terminal standstill.”111 At the same time, they do not deny that  
 
“[t]he ECtHR has effectively become the Constitutional Court 
for greater Europe, sitting at the apex of a single, trans-national, 
constitutional system, which links former communist states with 
the West, and the EU with non-members. The exercise of public 
power at every level of governance is formally constrained 
within this framework by a set of internationally justiciable, 
constitutional rights.”112 
 
Greer’s own proposals for reform of the system arrive at a point on 
which all agree: the survival of the Court is dependent on a much more 
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effective implementation of the Convention and its jurisprudence by 
member states in their own legal systems. As Patricia Egli points out:113 
 
“However, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, any 
reform of the Convention aimed at guaranteeing the long-term 
effectiveness of the Court must be accompanied by effective 
measures on the national level. Therefore, at its 114th session in 
May 2004, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
adopted three recommendations addressed to the member states 
concerning, respectively, university education and professional 
training;114 the verification of the compatibility of draft laws, 
existing laws and administrative practice with the standards laid 
down in the Convention;115 and the improvement of domestic 
remedies.116” 
 
This is also the “embeddedness” of the ECHR system in domestic law 
about which Lawrence Helfer has written.117 
In the opinion of this author, the construction of this impressive 
system would have been impossible without Russian membership of the 
ECHR system since 1998. It is not only the great irony of history, that 
Russia is now central to the system originally designed to counter the 
USSR; it is a great achievement for the system itself, in which Russia is still 
firmly accommodated even after 10 stormy years. Moreover, membership of 
the system has been of the greatest importance for Russia itself, enabling it 
to restore the great legal reforms of Tsar Aleksandr II in 1864, and to firmly 
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position Russian legislation if, not practice, back into the European 
tradition.118 A glance at the many textbooks and statutory commentaries 
published in Russia will show that the ECHR and its case law are a central 
part of the teaching and understanding of law in Russia, and the process of 
implementation has begun.119 
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Burkov has now completed his Ph.D. thesis, which will present a more complete and 
up to date analysis. 
